University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and
Interviews

Mike Mansfield Papers

7-21-1965

The Situation in Vietnam
Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Mansfield, Mike 1903-2001, "The Situation in Vietnam" (1965). Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and
Interviews. 602.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches/602

This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Mike Mansfield Papers at ScholarWorks at University
of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and Interviews by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

NO RELEASE BEFORE DELIVERY ON
SENATE FLOOR, WEDNESDAY,
SEPTEMBER 1 1 1§65
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D. 1 MONTANA)

VIET NAM: NARROWING THE ISSUES

Mr. President:

intensify.
rise.

The fighting in Viet Nam is unabated.

Military engagements

Casualties on all sides increase.

The streams of refugees

The extent of the devastation wrought is not known but it is

obviously immense.

Indeed, the costs of the heightened conflict in Viet

Nam already dwarf. the billion dollar development program for the Mekong
Project in Southeast Asia which was suggested by President Johnson in a
speech in April at Johns Hopkins University.
The President did not want it that way.
stated emphatically his preference for peace.
it at every opportunity.

At Johns Hopkins, he

He has since emphasized

He offered then, and he has offered again and

again, to enter into "unconditional discussions," in an effort to bring
the war to an end.

These appeals for negotiation, unfortunately, have

either been ignored, dismissed with derision, or otherwise rejected.
The efforts of various intermediary nations to initiate negotiations-efforts which have been endorsed by the United States--have met a similar
fate.

These attempts, in short, have all drawn a blank.
It might be concluded, therefore, that Hanoi and the Viet Cong

have no interest whatsoever in negotiating peace.

As if to reinforce

this conclusion, Ho Chi Minh has talked in terms of a 20-year war.

It

would appear, then, that Hanoi is determined to continue the military
struggle until the United States is driven into the sea.

But the

President has made clear that we will not permit that to happen and
it will not happen.
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There the matter stands.

Hanoi and the Southern Liberation

Front insist that they will not desist from the struggle and we will not
yield.

Is there, then, no alternative but a trial by arms in the three-,

five-, or ten-year conflict which is projected )y some of our own officials or the 20-year war which was mentioned by Ho Chi Minh?
Hanoi has indeed talked of a 20-year war.

But from that same

city there has also come talk of the conditions on which the war might
end.

Hanoi stated these conditions for peace in a radio broadcast on

April 12, 1965, in response to the President's Johns Hopkins speech.
The conditions were underscored subsequently by Peking and by Moscow.
From these announcements, it would appear that negotiations to end the
conflict are feasible, insofar as Hanoi is concerned, on the basis of
these four conditions:
1.

That the rights of the Vietnamese people--peace,

independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity--on the basis
of the Geneva Agreements are recognized;
2.

That the division of Viet Nam into tvo zones will

continue, pending peaceful reunification and that there will be no
foreign military alliances, bases, or troop personnel in connection
with either zone;

3. That the internal affairs of South Viet Nam will
be determined by the South Vietnamese people themselves alone in
accordance with the National Liberation Front program and without
any foreign interference;

4. That the peaceful reunification of Viet Nam will
be settled eventually by the Vietnamese people themselves in both
zones and withlut foreign interference.

- 3 I cite these conditions which have been set forth by Hanoi
because it is important that we do not assume that we are engaged in
Viet Nam against a group or a government which has no objective except
warfare for the sake of warfare.

On the contrary, it would appear that

the leaders in Hanoi and the Southern Liberation Front and their allies
in Peking and their supporters in Moscow have a very clear idea of why
they fight and, in the four points to which I have referred, of the
conditions on which they will cease fighting.
In a similar fashion, while some United States officials have
suggested, as noted, that we are engaged in a three-, five-, or ten-year
war, the President has also spoken of peace and the great desirability
of restoring it as quickly as possible in Viet Nam.

There are conditions

on which we, too, would be prepared to see this conflict terminated,
although there may still be confusion both at home and abroad as to
what these conditions may be.
To be sure, there have been pronouncements from various sources
and in general terms, about ending aggression from the North.

There has

been talk of aiding the South Vietnamese government as long as our aid is
sought.

There have been individual views of why we fight expressed in

the press, in Congress and in the Departments of the government.

But

with all due respect there could be set forth, cohesively, even now, the
basic conditions which United States policy regards as essential to peace
in Viet Nam.

Such conditions do exist.

They can be distilled from

President's Johnson's many statements on Viet Nam and other official
pronouncements.

And it may be useful at this time to set them forth,

once again, in cohesive form.

A clarification on this point may not

only be helpful to public understanding; it may also be a spur to the
initiation of negotiations.

- 4 In any event, t he Communists have not alone set forth the conditions for peace in Viet Nam.
be fully understood.

He have also done so even t hough they may not

Given the degree of American involvement and sacrifice,

vre, too, have the right and responsibility to define again and again as
concisely and as clearly as possible, the basic conditions for peace in t hat
nation, as we see them.
Indeed, it may be--and certainly, it is to be hoped--that the
clear juxtaposition of the two sets of conditions for peace may lead to
the "unconditional discussions" which are properly and urgently sought as
a means of bringing this bitter and brutal struggle to an end.
vlhen the official statements of the policy of the United States
of the past few months are examined, it would appear to me that these conditions for peace in Viet Nam have already been identified by the President
and his principle spokesmen during the past few months:
1.

There must be a verified choice by the people of South

Viet Nam of their own government--a choice free of terrorism, violence 1 and
coercion from any quarter.

In this connection, the President clearly stated

at Johns Hopkins that 'We want nothing for ourselves--only that the people
of South Viet Nam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way."
2.

There can be a future for South Viet Nam either in

independence or as a part of a unified Viet Nam on the basis of a peaceful,
free and verified expression of the wish of the people in each seecent of
that region and in general accord with the Geneva Agreements.

In a press

conference on July 28 1 the President gave emphasis to this point when he
said:

'We insist and we will always insist that the people of South Viet

Nam shall have the right of choice, the right to shape their own destiny
in free elections in the South, or throughout all Viet Nam under international supervision."
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3· There shall be a withdrawal of all foreign forces and
bases throughout Viet Nam, north and south, ;provided ;peace can be reestablished and provided the arrangements for ;peace include adequate
international guarantees of non-interference, not only for Viet Nam1 but
for Laos and for Cambodia as well.

This ;point was underscored by Secretary

McNamara on June 16 when he said, "the United States has no designs whatsoever on the territory or the resources of Southeast Asia or any country in
it.

Our national interests do not require that we introduce military bases

for our forces in Southeast Asia.

They don't require that the states of

Southeast Asia become members of Western military alliances.

The ultimate

goal of our country, therefore, in Southeast Asia is to hel;p maintain free
and independent nations there in which the people can develop politically,
economically, and socially, according to patterns of their own choosing,
and with the objective of becoming responsible members of the world family
of nations."
Further, we are parties to the Geneva Accord of 1962 which is
designed to achieve essentially these ends in Laos and we have expressed
our willingness to join in a resumption of a Geneva Conference for the
purpose of considering international guarantees of the independence,
integrity and borders of the Kingdom of Cambodia.
To these three basic conditions of peace, I would add two
corollaries which all of us must realize are obviously essential if peace
in Viet Nam is to be reached via the operations of negotiation rather than
through the exhaustion of war.
1.

*:

There needs to be provision for a secure amnesty for

t hose involved in the struggle on all sides in Viet Nam as an essential
block to an extension of the barbarism and atrocities of the struggle into
the subsequent peace and, indeed, as an essential of that ;peace.
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Ther e needs to be a willingness to accept, on all sides,

a cease-fire and stand-fast througpout all Viet Nam which might well coincide
with the initiation of negotiations.
President Johnson has made it clear, time and again, that we seek
no larger war.

He has made it clear, time and again, that we do not have

any territorial or military or other claim whatsoever in Viet Nam.

He has

said, time and again, that our only purpose is to help the South Vietnamese
people to secure their own future, free from coercion.

He has said, time

and again, that we are prepared for unconditional discussions with anyone,
anywhere, to bring about peace.

From that policy, as it has been enunciated

and as it is quoted, it would seem to me entirely valid to distill American
conditions for peace along the lines which have been enumerated.
To be sure, others may brush aside these conditions, even as we
tend to do the same with respect to the conditions which they have set
forth.

Hanoi may reach, via an automatic reflex, the conclusion that these

conditions, since they originate in the United States, can only mean domination of South Viet Nam by ourselves and those whom we support.

And, in all

frankness, we are prone to a converse conclusion, via the same reflex, with
respect to the conditions which are suggested from Hanoi .
mistrust and disbelief is understandable.

The reflex of

But unless the military conflict

is to expand and to continue into the indefinite fUture, whether it be 3,

5, 10 or 20 years of war, the degree of accuracy of these automatic reflexes must be tested in (t9gotiations .
The high purpose of negotiations 1 if they can be initiated,
should be to see to it that the conditions of peace wherever they may
originate come to mean in fact and in detail the domination of the Vietnamese people themselves over their future .

Beyond other considerations,

- 7 t his conflict involves primarily their country, their lives, their children.
It is the Vietnamese people, north and south, who suffer most from its devastating and tragic consequences.

And, in the end, it is they who should

have the right to determine the shape of the nation in which they live.
That is where negotiations can lead.
to lead.

That is where the President wants them

That is where they must lead, if there is ever to be a valid peace

in Viet Nam.

